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I 
ACCOUNTABILITY, VIABILITY, AND CONSULTATION 
rompted by economic, political, and cultural changes 
buffeting the nonprofit sector, public demand for greater 
financial accountability on the part of nonprofit organizations 
has intensified in recent decades.1  Increasingly, this demand is 
reflected by the imposition of new legal standards on directors 
and managers, and also on the employees and consultants on 
which they rely.  These newer impositions include additional 
federal and state disclosure rules, changes to state corporation 
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November 2006, at which the other participants were David Brennen, Evelyn 
Brody, Susan Gary, Robert Katz, and Mark Sidel.  This discussion, in turn, 
extended conversations that developed out of an earlier ARNOVA panel on 
democratic values as expressed through nonprofit governance.  Those participants 
included Evelyn Brody, David Hammack, Dana Brakman Reiser, and Mark Sidel.  
I express gratitude to them and to Putnam Barber, Burnele Venable Powell, and 
Jack Siegel for debating several of the views I have expressed here.  Thanks to 
Eireann Brooks, Lara Cahan, and Justin Levy for their diligent research assistance. 
1 The origin of this development can be traced to the transformation of 
incorporation from a privilege into an entitlement.  See NORMAN I. SILBER, A 
CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM:  THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN 
NONPROFIT SECTOR 127–59 (2001) (tracing the development of postincorporation 
regulatory supervision of nonprofit activity following the demise of the earlier 
approach to the approval of nonprofit charters). 
P 
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laws and federal tax laws, and stringent court interpretations of 
existing common-law fiduciary duties.2 
At the same time, the difficulties nonprofit organizations face 
in generating sufficient revenue to remain viable and address 
fundamental purposes have seldom been greater.  Gifts and 
bequests continue to decline as a proportion of overall revenue 
received.3  Funding through federal and state grants has proven 
inadequate.4  Although income earned from the provision of 
services, in contrast to income from contributions or grants, has 
been the largest and most consistently growing category of 
revenue for several decades, services that previously were 
provided almost exclusively by nonprofit agencies are today 
subject to ever-greater competition from for-profit businesses.5 
These twin “accountability” and “viability” challenges have 
been widely reported.6  To remain viable in this difficult 
environment, advisors encourage many nonprofit groups to 
change their operating and governance structures, to better build 
profitable lines of related and unrelated business, to attract fee-
for-service contracts, and otherwise to find new opportunities for 
making money that fit–even if only peripherally–within their 
 
2 See generally Ellen W. McVeigh & Eve R. Borenstein, The Changing 
Accountability Climate and Resulting Demands for Improved “Fiduciary Capacity” 
Affecting the World of Public Charities, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 119 (2004). 
3 See INDEP. SECTOR, URBAN INST., THE NEW NONPROFIT ALMANAC & DESK 
REFERENCE:  THE ESSENTIAL FACTS AND FIGURES FOR MANAGERS, 
RESEARCHERS, AND VOLUNTEERS (2002) [hereinafter NONPROFIT ALMANAC]; 
Leslie Lenkowsky, How Are Nonprofit Finances Changing?  New Data Make It 
Hard to Tell, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 9, 2006, at 34. 
4 See generally ALAN J. ABRAMSON ET AL., FY 2006 FEDERAL 
APPROPRIATIONS RECAP:  IMPACT ON NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (2005), 
http://www.nonprofitresearch.org/usr_doc/FY_2006_Appropriations_Final.pdf 
(stating “[o]ur analysis reveals that Congress eventually enacted nearly two-thirds 
of the spending cuts in these programs that the president had proposed for FY 
2006.”). 
5 See NONPROFIT ALMANAC, supra note 3; Lenkowsky, supra note 3. 
6 Peter Swords, The Form 990 as an Accountability Tool for 501(c)(3) Nonprofits, 
51 TAX L. 571, 573–74 (acknowledging that pressure from media enterprises has 
resulted in a “negative accountability” for nonprofits, and examining various tools 
as a model for encouraging accountability).  A third challenge, which has affected 
the governance structure of a significant number of nonprofits, especially those 
operating internationally, has only recently received some attention:  that posed by 
imperatives of security embodied in the USA PATRIOT Act and other measures 
addressing concern about terrorism in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.  See 
MARK SIDEL, MORE SECURE, LESS FREE?  ANTITERRORISM POLICY AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 87–115 (2004). 
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missions.7  It is an underappreciated consequence of the 
convergence of these developments that is the focus of this 
discussion:  what I will refer to as “anticonsultative” and 
“anticollaborative” imperatives.8 
Adaptation to any new legal environment often calls for 
outside advice and counsel, and the nonprofit environment is no 
exception.  With increasing frequency, scholars, attorneys, and 
consultants are advising groups that seek to comply with 
nonprofit laws and enhance their financial performance to turn 
away from several popular cultural traditions and conventional 
legal norms that characterized nonprofit governance.  In 
particular, they advise a turn from older patterns of decision 
making and an older advice literature, which, by and large, 
encouraged collaboration and consultation in the normal course 
of internal organization and governance.9 
The newer advice is different.  It is framed in terms of 
achieving very important general objectives, including “strategic 
positioning,”10 and providing greater transparency to outside 
 
7 See Michael H. Shuman & Merrian Fuller, Profits for Justice, THE NATION, Jan. 
24, 2005, at 13, 20–21 (challenging fellow nonprofit activists to develop other ways 
to generate revenue and to “try to wean ourselves from the charity habit, say by 3 
percent per year.  Think about just one piece of your agenda that could be framed 
as a revenue generator, dream about it a little, develop a business plan, and give it a 
try.”). 
8 The NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY defines the verb “consult” as 
meaning “to have discussions or confer with (someone),” as in “they’ve got to 
consult with their board of directors.”  (2d ed. 2001) (emphasis omitted).  The Latin 
root is “consulere,” meaning “take counsel.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  The same 
dictionary defines the verb “collaborate” as to “work jointly on an activity”; the 
root in Latin means “work together.”  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 One common understanding of nonprofit “collaboration” involves activity 
undertaken through joint ventures, rather than intraorganizational cooperation–
but that is not the sense in which it is used throughout this discussion.  For purposes 
of this discussion, collaborative acts involve collective assumption of responsibility 
for decisions; consultative acts involve actions by decision makers to seek advice or 
consent from others. 
9 Peter F. Drucker, a management specialist, recognized the special place of 
dissent and mission orientation.  He stated, “[t]oday, nonprofits understand that 
they need management all the more because they have no conventional bottom 
line.  Now they need to learn how to use management so they can concentrate on 
their mission.”  PETER F. DRUCKER & CONSTANCE ROSSUM, HOW TO ASSESS 
YOUR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION, WITH PETER DRUCKER’S FIVE MOST 
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS:  USER GUIDE FOR BOARDS, STAFF, VOLUNTEERS, AND 
FACILITATORS 2 (1993). 
10 See, e.g., THOMAS A. MCLAUGHLIN, NONPROFIT STRATEGIC POSITIONING:  
DECIDE WHERE TO BE, PLAN WHAT TO DO, at xviii (2006).  McLaughlin states, 
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observers;11 creating a more vibrant “culture of accountability”;12 
instituting more rigorous internal controls; and facilitating more 
adaptability to market conditions.13  With few variations, this 
advice often counsels the adoption of strategies for 
“streamlining” nonprofit governance along for-profit business 
principles in order to augment “corporate efficiency, and 
management development,” all in the name, ultimately, of 
service to the nonprofit mission.14 
Along the way, in many cases, consultative procedures for 
decision making and collaborative assignments of responsibility 
are subtly and not so subtly being identified as impediments to 
accountability for strong financial performance, and as barriers 
to the efficient accomplishment of mission-related goals.  As 
substitutes, hierarchical, formal, executive, and even autocratic 
 
Strategic positioning is a streamlined approach. . . . [T]he clear distinction 
between the roles of the board and the executive helps prevent the 
confusions and misunderstandings that often accompany traditional 
approaches.  It is a waste of time–and possibly worse–for board members 
to be involved in anything having to do with operations, including planning 
them. 
Id.  See also, e.g., John H. Goddeeris & Burton A. Weisbrod, Conversion from 
Nonprofit to For-Profit Legal Status:  Why Does It Happen and Should Anyone 
Care? in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT:  THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 129 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed. 1998) (explaining that 
conversion to for-profit structures occurs due to legal, regulatory, and constraint 
changes in the environment of the organization.). 
11 See RICHARD E. OLIVER, WHAT IS TRANSPARENCY? 7–8 (2004) (explaining 
that transparency is critical for nonprofits with regard to reputation and continued 
donations); see also, e.g., DAN TAPSCOTT & DAVID TICOLL, THE NAKED 
CORPORATION:  HOW THE AGE OF TRANSPARENCY WILL REVOLUTIONIZE 
BUSINESS (2003). 
12 See George G. Brenkert, The Need for Corporate Integrity, in CORPORATE 
INTEGRITY & ACCOUNTABILITY 1, 9–10 (George G. Brenkert ed. 2004) (discussing 
the growing trend of corporate accountability and the “obvious extension” of that 
trend to nonprofit organizations); see also, e.g., THE 2004 GRANT THORNTON 
NAT’L BOARD GOVERNANCE SURVEY FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORG. [hereinafter 
GRANT THORNTON SURVEY] (Grant Thornton, LLP, U.S. member firm of Grant 
Thornton Int’l), Sept. 2004, at 9, available at http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/ 
GTCom/files/Industries/NotforProfit/Grant_Thornton_Board_Governance_Survey 
_2004.pdf (a survey of 700 nonprofit CEOs indicated that 24 percent had engaged 
their external auditor to examine their internal controls; 90 percent of those 
questioned indicated that their auditors had produced a management letter). 
13 See, e.g., GRANT THORNTON SURVEY, supra note 12; Shuman & Fuller, supra 
note 7. 
14 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 10, at 22.  Mclaughlin reserves the term 
“collaboration” for cooperation among nonprofits, rather than within them.  See id. 
at 82–88. 
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procedures and organizational structures largely borrowed from 
the for-profit business world are being identified as positive 
reforms and essential legal requirements in the new climate for 
nonprofit activity.15 
Many nonprofits, of course, don’t need to be counseled to 
change in these ways because they have never operated along 
especially consultative or collaborative lines.16  Nor does it seem 
likely that any neat pattern would emerge if nonprofits were 
measured by the degree to which they currently operate and 
govern themselves hierarchically or consultatively.  
Furthermore, some business models are not intrinsically 
anticonsultative or anticollaborative.17  But the trend I along 
with others observe is an across-the-board, norm-shifting change 
in the impetus to develop certain business-like operating 
practices. 
If this claim is accurate, it is time to review the role of laws 
and legal institutions in promoting, inhibiting, or acquiescing to 
the anticollaborative, anticonsultative trend.  Until now, the 
 
15 At least one nonprofit relief organization has even begun holding 
“shareholders’ meetings.”  Stephanie Strom, Charity Invites Donors to ‘Kick the 
Tires’ and Squeeze the Cash Register, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at A14.  
Administrative solutions have also been advanced.  See Victor B. Flatt, Notice and 
Comment for Nonprofit Organizations, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 65, 72–79 (2002) 
(proposing a procedure, along the lines of the Administrative Procedure Act, to 
improve accountability within nonprofit organizations). 
16 It is not unusual for foundations and trusts to operate on somewhat 
authoritarian lines, based on the founding documents of their benefactors or the 
advice of their agents.  Within certain parts of the nonprofit sector, hierarchical 
structures are more common than in others.  For example, among religious groups 
there is a wide degree of variation in the level to which voluntary organizations 
adopt a hierarchical or more participatory organizational structure.  See, e.g., 
HENRY BIBB ET AL., MAKING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE UNITED STATES 
159–203 (David C. Hammack ed. 1998) (describing the varieties of nonprofit 
religious groups). 
17 Compare JIM COLLINS, GOOD TO GREAT:  WHY SOME COMPANIES MAKE 
THE LEAP . . . AND OTHERS DON’T 13 (2001) (“When you have disciplined people, 
you don’t need hierarchy.  When you have disciplined thought, you don’t need 
bureaucracy.  When you have disciplined action, you don’t need excessive controls.  
When you combine a culture of discipline with an ethic of entrepreneurship, you get 
the magical alchemy of great performance.”) with Anders Porter, Taking Care of 
Business in Sweden, Nov. 17, 2006, http://www.sweden.se/templates/cs/ 
Article____15632.aspx (discussing Swedish business practices and stating “Swedish 
companies tend to be less hierarchical than companies in many other countries 
when it comes to internal organization.  This . . . eras[es] some of the chain-of-
command arrangements that exist in other countries. . . . [I]t’s possible for 
employees to take their comments, questions or concerns directly to the boss.”). 
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ways the law accommodates and encourages such transplanted 
business models with new statutory proscriptions and 
administrative guidelines, and allows relaxed common-law 
interpretations of the older statutes which demote consultative 
values, have received little study.18  But some commentators 
express concern.  As Paul C. Light has written, “[j]ust because 
the nonprofit sector needs to improve its performance does not 
necessarily mean it has to become more businesslike.”19 
There might be no point to challenging or regretting the 
movement of the law as it responds to these newer imperatives.  
Becoming more businesslike, after all, has saved many 
nonprofits from the brink of financial disaster–and it builds 
capacity for mission accomplishment in many others.20  To a 
considerable extent, larger social and economic conditions have 
forged the anticonsultative legal reformation.  If becoming 
increasingly businesslike is a practical necessity–and if it 
requires relaxing the legal constraints which have imposed 
consultative and collaborative norms–then relaxation of these 
rules is the desirable response. 
Equally cautionary to those who would think about restoring 
traditional constraints are questions about appropriate legal 
boundaries:  perhaps matters of internal deliberative process are, 
and should be, irrelevant as a matter of state-ordered nonprofit 
law.  Why should the public law care how a nonprofit 
accomplishes its mission through private corporate 
understandings, so long as the nonprofit is effective in working 
toward its approved goals?  If only “ends” should count, then the 
time has come to bury the legal demand for collaboration–and 
to embrace the idea that consultation, collaboration, and 
democratic values are important only insofar as they are 
valuable tools in the accomplishment of a nonprofit mission.21 
 
18 See infra Part II. 
19 Paul C. Light, “Nonprofit-Like” Tongue Twister or Aspiration?  8 NONPROFIT 
Q., at 4, 4 (Summer 2001, issue 2), available at http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/ 
section/87.html. 
20 See Mike Woelflein, Foundations of Community, BANGORMETRO, 
http://www.bangormetro.com/media/Bangor-Metro/October-2005/Foundations-of-
Community/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2007) (taking an investment firm approach to 
organization, the Maine Community Fund weathered the recession following 9/11 
and has since seen dramatic revenue increases). 
21 States charter nonprofit organizations which establish legitimate purposes and 
missions under their governing laws.  The Internal Revenue Service and other 
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On the other hand, it is possible that legal institutions should 
treat more seriously the claim that a great number of nonprofits, 
in addition to distinguishing themselves from for-profits through 
their formal commitment to the “nondistribution constraint,” 
possess distinctive associational attributes that collectively 
identify, enhance, and justify the special treatment they receive 
from courts and legislatures.  It could be that these 
characteristics have played a crucial role in fostering deliberative 
discourse, creating social capital, and providing a foundation for 
expressive pluralism.22  Regulatory actors, legislatures, and 
professional groups might then establish minimal levels of 
consultation and collaboration through the collective assignment 
of fiduciary responsibilities for some or all classes of nonprofits. 
If legal institutions embrace such an interventionist 
perspective, and this article does not conclude that they 
necessarily should, then reinforcement of process-oriented rules 
deserves further consideration, including governance reforms 
ranging from strengthened consultative procedures, to more 
rigorous legal standards to assess the process of mission 
performance, to compulsory constituent representation in 
management or board decision making.  Limits could also be 
imposed on the wholesale adoption of for-profit management 
and governance models in nonprofit organizations.  Functional 
disincentives to engaging in inconsistent for-profit activities, such 
as taxes on unrelated business income, or strictures against 
excessive compensation, could be strengthened.  Restraining 
entrepreneurial approaches, or encouraging collaborative and 
consultative ones, could reinforce traditional consultative legal 
norms instead of jettisoning them. 
The short exploration below of legal developments in 
nonprofit governance related to corporate advice literature, 
nonprofit boards, management practices, and membership rights 
 
taxing bodies confer eligibility for tax exemption based in significant part on the 
extent to which the missions and purposes of the organization comply with relevant 
statutory provisions and enforcement agencies–particularly the office of the 
attorney general–and evaluate the performance of nonprofit organizations based 
not on collaborativeness, but rather on the relationship between their activities and 
their avowed purposes and missions.  Few, if any, rankings or evaluations of 
nonprofit organizations base their findings substantially on internal processes as 
opposed to external results. 
22 See generally SILBER, supra note 1. 
SILBER.FMT 3/3/2008  8:32:57 AM 
72 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 65 
might contribute to understanding which of these views–if 
either of them–might be correct. 
II 
THE CORPORATE ADVICE LITERATURE 
It is unnecessary to dwell on whether the accountability and 
viability challenges mentioned above are real and significant 
because the literature in nonprofit studies contains ample 
validation.23  Conferences devoted to these subjects are held 
every year.24  Enforcement proceedings brought against 
nonprofits related to instances of financial mismanagement have 
become more numerous.  Leaders of nonprofit organizations 
profess regret that they spend more and more time on the 
improvement of their “bottom line” than on accomplishing their 
missions.25 
It is more controversial to observe that, notwithstanding 
cautionary verbiage to the contrary, much of the advice that 
consultants provide to nonprofit boards and managers actually 
takes aim at collaborative and consultative traditions through its 
support for isolating and particularizing organizational 
responsibilities, creating businesslike hierarchies, and truncating 
collective decision making.  Notwithstanding the homage that 
the consulting literature often pays to the need to sustain a 
“collaborative” culture or a “positive” working environment, 
true enthusiasm for consultative and collective activity is usually 
absent from consulting reports and guidance, because, from the 
point of view of addressing these accountability/viability 
 
23 See, e.g., Peter Swords, Conference Notes:  Norman A. Sugarman Memorial 
Lecture, Nonprofit Accountability:  The Sector’s Response to Gov’t Regulation, 25 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 413 (1999), available at http://www.qual990.org/ 
np_account.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2007) (arguing for stronger generic oversight 
agencies). 
24 See, e.g., Conference Schedule for Lyndon B. Johnson Sch. of Pub. Affairs at 
Univ. of Tex. (Austin), http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/rgk/press/presentations.php (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2007). 
25 See Lester M. Salamon & Richard O’Sullivan, Stressed but Coping:  Nonprofit 
Organizations and the Current Fiscal Crisis, LISTENING POST PROJECT FINDING 
COMMUNIQUE NO. 2, Jan. 19, 2004, at 1, 1, available at www.jhu.edu/listeningpost/ 
news/pdf/comm02.pdf (study finds that “American nonprofits have become, in 
many cases, highly entrepreneurial organizations, responding actively and creatively 
to new fiscal pressures.  At the same time, however, the survey also makes clear that 
these pressures are exacting a toll.”). 
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challenges, consultation and collaboration are not helpful.26  
Considering the strong bias in our political and social culture 
toward open democratic discourse and the universally positive 
meaning ascribed to collaboration, however, it would be 
surprising if advisors actually went on the record to openly 
endorse curtailing these practices. 
The newer advice literature urges directors and managerial 
personnel to devote greater attention to managerial 
accounting;27 to create more “professionalized,” “financially 
expert” operations;28 and to develop “more formal” forms of 
business organization.  The implication is that extensive 
consultation intrinsically produces delay and discord.  
Embedded is the message that although collaboration might 
promote civic virtue, such virtue is not a typical nonprofit 
entity’s raison d’être; and that, on the contrary, it can in 
important instances diffuse and conceal responsibility (not a 
good thing).  Effective managerial methods that emulate the best 
for-profit business methods for establishing accountability at the 
individual level, on the other hand, tend to intensify and expose 
inefficiencies and weak links (a very good thing).29 
 
26 See, e.g., RICHARD P. CHAIT ET AL., GOVERNANCE AS LEADERSHIP:  
REFRAMING THE WORK OF NONPROFIT BOARDS 2 (2005) (“Historically, the 
stereotypical image of a nonprofit administrator was a well-intentioned ‘do-gooder,’ 
. . . trained as a social worker, educator, cleric, artist, or physician. . . . Yesterday’s 
naive nonprofit administrator or executive director has become today’s 
sophisticated president or CEO, titles that betray changes in the stature, perception, 
and professionalism of the positions.”). 
27 See, e.g., Four Tips for Implementing Managerial Accounting Principles at Your 
Nonprofit, NONPROFIT FISCAL FITNESS, Mar., 2005, http://www.blackbaud.com/ 
files/Newsletters/FiscalFitness/2005/fiscalfitnessmarch2k5.pdf; Press Release, Open 
Soc’y Inst., Baltimore Nonprofits Working to Make Their Enterprises More 
Businesslike (Dec. 1, 2004), available at  http://www.soros.org/initiatives/baltimore/ 
news/nonprofits_20041201. 
28 William Foster & Gail Fine, How Nonprofits Get Really Big, STAN. SOC. 
INNOVATION. REV., Spring 2007, at 54, available at http://www.ssireview.org/ 
images/articles/2007SP_feature_fosterfine.pdf (explaining that heightened 
professionalism and devotion to a culture of finance are essential elements in the 
quest to become big). 
29 See, e.g., Jeff McDonald, Conflict over S.D. Office Puts Athletes in the Middle; 
Special Olympics Investigation Outrages Group’s Donors, Volunteers, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., Mar. 16, 2007, at A1 (describing an investigation of operations in 
which “[t]he picture emerging . . . was one of an internal struggle over the nonprofit 
group’s management style and business model.”  Volunteers for the organization 
“described the investigation as a ‘turf war’ between Jackson and his superiors, 
especially Roxanne Thompson . . . now a chief fundraiser for Special Olympics 
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Empirical studies might test whether the new nonprofit 
culture of financial effectiveness and accountability increasingly 
addresses consultative activities in governance and management, 
however obliquely, as unaffordable, unnecessary, and even 
counterproductive democratic luxuries.  Determining whether 
the number of membership organizations has in fact grown or 
diminished in recent years, for example, might illuminate one 
aspect of the phenomenon, since membership organizations are 
traditionally and by nature the most consultative.30  Also 
indicative might be studies to find out whether the rights 
attached to membership themselves have become fewer.31  
Tracking changes in the number of self-perpetuating 
organizations might also be useful, as it might reveal the 
unwillingness of boards to trust their members or classes of 
members to play a significant role in the power to determine 
successorship.32 
It would be interesting to discover whether the vocabulary of 
business missions has migrated to the nonprofit world and 
supplanted older and more mission-oriented vocabulary.  For 
example, it would be useful to know whether the number of 
leaders who prefer to call themselves “president” or “CEO” of 
their nonprofit organizations, rather than, for example, 
“executive director,” has increased; or whether the 
organization’s services are routinely called “the product,” and its 
reputation referred to as “the franchise” or “the brand.”33  
Results of this sort might verify the trend–but the question of 
 
Southern California.  Jackson has a relaxed management style, they said, and that 
didn’t sit well with the more organized Thompson.”). 
30 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society:  The Social Cost of 
Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 849–58 (2003) (noting that 
nonprofit organizations rely on members as being “decision-makers,” “monitors,” 
and “enforcers”). 
31 Norman I. Silber, A Membership Bill of Rights (unpublished manuscript, 
presented in 2001 at annual conference for Ass’n for Research on Nonprofit Org. 
and Voluntary Action). 
32 See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE:  THE COLLAPSE AND 
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (creatively developing metrics to 
argue that a demise in “social capital” has occurred). 
33 The competencies and duties of nonprofit leaders are also often defined in 
terms more commonly linked to for-profit business leaders.  See Shamima Ahmed, 
Desired Competencies and Job Duties of Non-Profit CEOs in Relation to the Current 
Challenges:  Through the Lens of CEOs’ Job Advertisements, 24 J. MGMT. DEV. 913 
(2005). 
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the real significance of the new vocabulary would even then not 
remain free of doubt. 
The question here at hand is properly addressed not by 
empirical analysis of practices but through an investigation of 
developing legal norms.  How “elastic” has the legal regime 
become–and how elastic should it become–in accommodating 
transplanted business models for governance and organization?34 
III 
LEGAL ACCOMMODATION:  THE BOARD 
A nonprofit legal regime which for more than two centuries 
usually extolled the governance values of democratic expression, 
collective action, and broad principles of consultation among 
different constituencies might have difficulty–one would 
think–doing an abrupt about-face.35  Nevertheless, adaptations 
have emerged swiftly, by way of courts, state officials, federal 
regulators, enforcement bodies, law revisions, and academic 
formulations.  A few examples below illustrate that legal 
institutions are accommodating new attitudes toward board self-
governance, management accountability, and membership 
involvement by relaxing several existing norms of consultation 
and importing different ones from for-profit guides. 
A.  Nondisclosure Agreements 
One indicator that attitudes about consultation and sharing 
fiduciary responsibilities among board members are changing is 
the transition toward formal nondisclosure pledges and 
agreements.  For as long as there have been boardrooms, board 
majorities have tried to prevent dissident directors from raising 
policy differences in public or bringing problems to the attention 
of regulatory authorities.  Recently, however, the dominant 
majorities on some nonprofit boards have begun to ask for 
 
34 Of course, this is not the only elasticity of interest.  For example, the extent to 
which permissible compensation includes bonuses or other incentives based on 
financial performance also tests the willingness of the law to relax the 
nondistribution constraint in the interest of models for business productivity. 
35 But see supra note 16 and accompanying text (indicating that certain nonprofit 
organizational traditions, especially those growing out of religious principles of 
organization, have involved hierarchical and nonconsultative traditions from the 
outset). 
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binding pledges not to air differences or even talk to the media 
about corporate affairs outside the boardroom.36  In the for-
profit world, particularly on large corporate boards, formal 
“nondisclosure” or “gag” agreements are not unusual,37 and they 
are frequently justified as efforts to preserve proprietary 
information and to prevent inappropriate insider behavior. 
In the nonprofit context, nondisclosure agreements or the use 
of “executive session” rules to curtail debates about policy and 
procedure depart from established norms.  They shut down 
opportunities for public dialogue and for communication with 
other concerned and influential parties, including reporters.  
Until recent decades, and despite a longstanding emphasis by 
nonprofits on recruiting board members and managers who are 
“team players” and encouraging “closure” on contentious 
matters, nondisclosure agreements have been virtually 
unknown.38  Discussions in executive sessions, where views 
expressed and subjects discussed are not to be divulged to 
 
36 Hewlett Packard’s boardroom soap opera received great notoriety in large part 
because private investigators used illegal tactics to obtain the phone records of 
dissident board members; less well known is the agreement Hewlett Packard 
directors signed which obligated them.  See Douglas M. Branson, Built to Last?  
Hewlett-Packard’s Problems Teach Lessons About Corporate Governance, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 26, 2006, at A10; see also Peter J. Howe, Weld 
Lambastes T Pension Board, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 28, 1992, at 72 (board votes to 
prevent its members from talking to reporters); Many Knew of Tyco Bonuses, 
Witness Says; The Former Head of Human Resources Says Auditors Were Aware of 
the Disputed Payments, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2005, at C5 (nondisclosure statements 
“asked” for by management from key employees who received compensation 
bonuses); Carolyn Said, Corporate Directors See Risks Climbing, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 
11, 2002, at 61, 64 (practice of obtaining nondisclosure agreements in the context of 
mergers and acquisitions nearly universal); Julie Solomon, Activists Fear SEC Proxy 
Rule, BOSTON GLOBE, May 10, 1992, at 33 (restricted ballot initiatives on proxy 
statements); Dominic Jones, Corporate Boards Should Communicate More, IR 
Web Report, http://www.irwebreport.com/daily/2006/09/11/corporate-boards-
should-communicate-more/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
37 For example, Apple Computer Inc. is known for its closed-lips approach to 
market strategy.  See Daily Briefing, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 12, 2005, at 26 
(reporting on San Jose court narrowing reporters’ privilege to reveal employees 
who described new Apple products); Nick Wingfield, At Apple, Secrecy Complicates 
Life but Maintains Buzz, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2005, at A1. 
38 See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Nonprofit Takeovers:  Regulating the Market 
for Mission Control, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1181, 1249 (2006) (considering insurgent 
friendly and incumbent friendly rules and recommending “[a]n intermediate, 
governance-protective standard for reviewing nonprofit takeover defenses most 
appropriately resolves these tensions by channeling mission change through an 
incremental, dialogic process.”). 
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anyone else, have traditionally been reserved for personnel 
matters and questions concerning pending or potential litigation. 
In this context, the suggestion that tough nondisclosure 
policies would be embraced by a nonprofit membership 
organization devoted to the promotion of civil liberties would 
seem something of a bad joke.  Nevertheless, the New York 
Times reported in 2006 that the board of the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), stung by negative publicity attendant 
to news interviews with some of its own board members, was 
proceeding to develop new policies to curb certain forms of 
board members’ public criticism of the organization and of 
fellow board members.  One idea that circulated among 
members would have discouraged criticism that would reflect 
negatively on the integrity of the ACLU’s decision making 
process or the capability of its staff members.39 
After publication of the New York Times report, some donors 
and former board and staff members of the ACLU called for the 
ouster of the organization’s leadership, asserting it “failed to 
adhere to the principles it demands of others and thus 
jeopardized the organization’s effectiveness.”40  An attorney in 
the office of New York’s Attorney General reportedly contacted 
the organization informally to ensure that nothing in any of the 
proposed rules discouraged the reporting of illegal activity.41  
 
39 Stephanie Strom, A.C.L.U. May Block Criticism by Its Board, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 24, 2006, at A20. 
40 Stephanie Strom, Supporters of A.C.L.U. Call for the Ouster of Its Leaders, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at A14; see also Wendy Kaminer, How the ACLU Lost 
Its Bearings, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 2006, at M3; Stephanie Strom, A.C.L.U. Withdraws 
Proposals to Limit Public Criticism by Board Members, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2006, 
at A16. 
41 Compare Memorandum from Susan Herman to the NYCLU Board (2006) (on 
file with author) (setting forth that the NY Times report “did not mention what the 
committee had actually been asked to do . . . that the committee had firmly rejected 
the idea of imposing any sanctions on directors (like expulsion) . . . [and] that, at the 
end of the meeting, [the executive director] announced that the committee needed 
to go back to the drawing board . . . .”) with Memorandum from Ira Glasser to 
Susan Herman (2006) (on file with author) (explaining that everyone who has read 
those proposals–except for the nine ACLU committee members who voted for 
them, the Board members who defended them, and the executive committee that 
reviewed them five months earlier and failed to object to them–“clearly sees how 
they hypocritically violate fundamental ACLU free speech principles.”  Many 
argued that the reason the Board didn’t vote was because a more deliberative 
process was required.  “Then after much unfavorable publicity and donor 
complaints, Nadine [Strossen] called . . . and forcefully requested [the chair] to get 
the committee to withdraw the proposals that the Board had only a few weeks ago 
SILBER.FMT 3/3/2008  8:32:57 AM 
78 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 65 
Perhaps due to negative publicity about the proposals and the 
New York Attorney General’s intervention or else because the 
proposals never had sufficient support to go forward, the board 
never voted on the proposals.42 
For present purposes, it is remarkable that no legal 
impediment would have prevented implementation of a 
proposed policy of board self-censorship and reprisal for 
information sharing had the board acted through a bylaw change 
to suppress dissemination of information that would reflect 
negatively on the decision-making process.  Short of a rule 
preventing board members from notifying regulators that laws 
have been or are about to be broken, a policy preventing 
disclosure of internal disputes–especially policy discussions 
designated as confidential–does not violate any state law, or 
any set of applicable governance principles.43  In fact, the 
proposed American Law Institute’s Principles of Nonprofit 
Governance impose an affirmative obligation on the part of 
governing board members to maintain secrecy.44 
 
refused to allow a vote to reject.”).  See also Letter from Members of the Executive 
Board of the ACLU to “ACLU Friends and Colleagues” (October 3, 2006) (on file 
with author). 
42 See supra note 41. 
43 As a general rule, however, the duty of loyalty prevents directors and officers 
from profiting from transactions through secret arrangements.  See, e.g., N.Y. 
N.P.C.L. Sec. 715. 
44 See AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 340(b), at 
311 (Tentative Draft No. 1, Nov. 1, 2007).  Section 340, subsection (b) states that 
each member of the governing board “[m]ust preserve the confidentiality of 
information that the board member knows or has reason to know is confidential,” 
and contains an exception for a board member to disclose in good faith “to the 
attorney general or other regulator or to a court confidential information that he or 
she reasonably believes appropriate to prevent, mitigate, or remedy harm to the 
charity.”  Id.  The comment to subsection (b) explains that confidential information 
“includes details of board deliberations and opinions expressed by and votes of 
fellow board members.”  Id. § 340(b) cmt. c, at 315.  The confines of the duty are 
subject to some modification by the organizational documents, see id. § 305, at 47–
48, and the comments to section 300 observe that while  
[h]ealthy debate is good for governance[,] [a]n outvoted board member . . . 
should respect the confidentiality of board deliberations, and should not 
impede the implementation of decisions properly reached by the governing 
board.  Once a final decision has been reached, public criticism might be 
permissible consistent with fiduciary duties.  If disagreements are 
fundamental and material, a board member who is unable to support 
decisions of the board should consider resigning. 
Id. § 300(a) cmt. f, at 32 (citations omitted).  Confidential information is defined in 
section 340, comment c, as “nonpublic information that (or other person working or 
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B.  Committee Charters 
A second indicator that attitudes about consultation and 
sharing fiduciary responsibilities among board members are 
changing appears in the widespread enthusiasm for the formal 
adoption of committee charters, and the resulting impact on 
information flow and decision making.  Governance specialists 
increasingly express the view that the recent “charter 
movement,” with its inclination to formalize and contain 
committee responsibilities, reflects a reasonable step toward 
improving the functionality of boards:  an effort to increase 
accountability and efficiency by designating and clarifying 
responsibilities within governing bodies, which in the world of 
nonprofit corporations operate collectively.45 
The trend toward the formal adoption of committee charters 
has grown markedly in recent years as a result of encouragement 
to transplant the audit committee accountability measures 
legislated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for for-profits, and in the 
wake of for-profit scandals epitomized in the failures of Enron 
Corporation and WorldCom Corporation at the turn of the 
millennium.46  Virtually all who counsel nonprofit organizations 
about “best practices” recommend written committee charters 
for audit committees, and most recommend them for most or all 
important committees.47 
 
volunteering for the organization) has been given or learned in his or her capacity 
as a board member.”  Id. § 340(b) cmt. c, at 315. 
45 But see, e.g., Lumen N. Mulligan, What’s Good for the Goose is Not Good for 
the Gander:  Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981 
(2007). 
46 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006)).  This 
provision requires that the audit committee of the board of directors “shall establish 
procedures for–(A) the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by 
the issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters; 
and (B) the confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of 
concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.”  See also Regina 
F. Burch, Director Oversight and Monitoring:  The Standard of Care and the 
Standard of Liability Post–Enron, 6 WYO. L. REV. 481, 531 (2006); Richard A. 
Wiley, Sarbanes-Oxley:  Does It Really Apply to Non-Profit and Private 
Corporations?, 50 BOSTON B. J. 10, 13 (Mar./Apr. 2006) (recommending that all 
sizeable nonprofits adopt “three standing Board Committees:  Audit, Governance, 
and Compensation.  Each is important and should have clear charters as to 
responsibilities and authority.”). 
47 See, e.g., McDermott Will & Emery, Best Practices:  Nonprofit Corporate 
Governance, http://www.mwe.com/info/news/wp0604a.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 
2007) (recommending a written audit committee charter). 
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Through the lens developed here, however, there are 
potential adverse consequences to be evaluated along with the 
positive gains.  Have those charters which actually are being 
adopted served, in fact, to protect committees from interference 
and second-guessing?  Have committee charters discouraged 
information from flowing from committees down to managers or 
sideways to other board members?  Have they sanctioned a 
“hyperdelegation” which transcends what the laws previously 
allowed?  Do they contribute to the tendency to concentrate 
legal responsibility for monitoring in fewer hands?  Written 
charters are, in many instances, adopted by unilateral 
amendments to bylaws and can reduce the number of persons 
who are responsible for making decisions, restrict membership 
on committees to specialists rather than generalists, and isolate 
and confine responsibility.  To the extent that the number of 
directors involved in deliberating on important issues shrinks, it 
is at least possible that losses from diminished deliberation could 
be as significant as gains in formal accountability.48 
Consider People ex rel. v. Grasso in which the Chairman of 
the New York Stock Exchange, at the time a nonprofit 
corporation, received in excess of $150 million in compensation 
over the course of a short time period.49  Details of the 
compensation package that were known to the compensation 
committee were unknown to members of the wider board, who 
testified “that they did not know about the [Supplemental 
Executive Retirement Plan] and if they did, they did not know 
what the balance was.”50  The court characterized this as an 
“affirmative defense of neglect,” and declared that for “a 
fiduciary of any institution, profit or not-for-profit, [to] honestly 
admit that he was unaware of a liability of over $100 million, or 
even over $36 million, is a clear violation of the duty of care.”51  
And yet for-profit corporations have adopted compensation 
 
48 On the other hand, the recent case of People ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso suggests 
that courts are, at least in extreme circumstances, disinclined to accept 
compartmentalized responsibilities that result in violation of fiduciary duties.  See 
People ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso, No. 401620/04, Slip op., 2006 WL 3016952, at *27 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 2006), rev’d on other grounds, 836 N.Y.S.2d 40 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2007). 
49 See id. at *3. 
50 Id. at *31. 
51 Id. 
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committee charters which grant sole authority for setting 
compensation to members of the compensation committee, 
limiting the responsibility of other board members to read and 
depriving them of authority to review supporting materials that 
the compensation committee relies on.52  It is unclear how far 
nonprofit corporations will or can go to mirror such for-profit 
restrictions. 
The debate about whether to extend Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
requirements for identifying particular committee functions 
through charters and for designating financial experts has often 
taken place on the assumption that the disadvantage is the cost 
of compliance, and the advantage is better supervision and 
governance.  But the question of whether it changes the dynamic 
of nonprofit collaboration in some undesirable ways needs to be 
considered, as well.53  It is remarkable that the template for 
nonprofit organizations has become widespread without 
extended analysis of whether aspects of the movement can lead 
to diminished collaboration among board members, and perhaps 
to a reduction in the diffusion of important knowledge to larger 
circles.54 
 
52 See generally the McDonald’s Corporation Compensation Committee Charter, 
available at http://www.mcdonalds.com/corp/invest/gov/board_committees/ 
compensation_committee.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2007) (giving Compensation 
Committee exclusive control over executive officers’ and other employees’ 
compensation packages). 
53 In the for-profit context, some have resisted the application of the charters for 
the purposes for which they were intended.  See Robert Eli Rosen, Resistances to 
Reforming Corporate Governance:  The Diffusion of QLCCs, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1251, 1293 (2005) (referring to the Sherman & Stearling survey finding that “[t]he 
audit committees of sixty of the Top 100 companies have attempted to . . . limit the 
scope of the issues that audit committees will consider.  They also have attempted 
to limit the reports that audit committees receive about compliance.”  The survey 
also states that “[f]ifteen of the Top 100 companies include in their audit 
committee’s charter exculpatory language to the effect that it is ‘not [the] audit 
committee’s responsibility to ensure compliance with laws.’”). 
54 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society:  The Social Cost of 
Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 830 (2003) (claiming that 
the state now manages and directs the market for free enterprise); Dana Brakman 
Reiser, Enron.org:  Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit 
Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205, 212–15 (2004) (identifying inadequate 
thought given to mission enforcement); see also Larry Cata Backer, Surveillance 
and Control:  Privatizing and Nationalizing Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-
Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 437 (2004) (suggesting principally with respect 
to for-profits that “the architecture of ‘detect and report’ so prominent in 
[Sarbanes-Oxley] easily fits into the sort of anti-corruption statutes that have risen 
to prominence in the last thirty years.”). 
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During the drafting of the American Law Institute’s Principles 
of Nonprofit Governance (Nonprofit Principles Project), debates 
about circumscribing the duties of directors exposed a divide 
between practitioners and academics about the virtues of 
extending, further than in current law, immunities resulting from 
the delegation and specialization of responsibilities.55  The 
Nonprofit Principles Project does not address the relevance of 
this argument to the accelerating trend toward defining 
specialized board responsibilities by using committee charters.56  
The argument was pressed, however, that directors who are not 
assigned to particular committees or recruited onto boards for 
fundraising purposes should be freed from general fiduciary 
duties and oversight responsibilities–even if those duties 
involve acts as simple as reading committee reports or going to 
meetings.57 
C.  Streamlined Governance 
A third indicator that attitudes about consultation and sharing 
fiduciary responsibilities among board members are changing is 
regulatory pressure to restructure–to “downsize” or 
 
55 See AM. L. INST., supra note 44.  Section 300, Fiduciary Duties, provides that 
“[e]ach governing-board member shall in good faith exercise the fiduciary duties of 
loyalty (§ 310) and care (§ 315).”  The comments elaborate that “[t]he board (or 
committee) makes decisions as a group.”  Id. at § 300, cmt. c(1).  The draft 
particularly states the duty to protect information flow, but does not require 
consultation and collaboration.  See § 320, Board Responsibilities, Functions, and 
Composition, which states: 
(a) All powers of the charity are exercised by or under the authority of its 
governing board, and the activities and affairs of the charity are managed 
by, or under the direction and subject to the oversight of, the governing 
board (see § 325).  The governing board must ensure that those persons 
who are responsible for the affairs of the charity are clearly identified.  (b) 
Subject to any authority reserved to the charity’s membership or other 
person, the governing board’s functions normally include, but are not 
limited to:  . . . (7) overseeing appropriate communication with the charity’s 
constituencies and the public; and (8) establishing appropriate procedures 
for internal controls, including financial controls, legal compliance, and 
information flow to the board. 
56 Id. at § 320. 
57 See AM. L. INST., supra note 44, § 300, at 25; § 300(a) cmt. b.  The Principles 
leave “open significant questions,” especially “what does it mean to say ‘[s]ome, but 
less than all, of the powers’ of the board can be assigned to a designated body?”  Id. 
at xxxviii (quoting id. § 320 cmt. b(2)(a), at 119).  Nevertheless they “endorse . . . 
the view that all board members should bear responsibility for governance.”  Id. at 
xxxviii–xxxix. 
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“streamline”–advisory boards and consultation mechanisms.  
Advice encouraging streamlining usually emphasizes two 
important aspects of nonprofit governance:  that most nonprofit 
board members are volunteers whose time and energy should be 
marshaled carefully; and that nonprofits must, in a market-
driven economy and a crisis-oriented world, make important 
decisions entrepreneurially and rapidly.58 
Streamlining nonprofit governance by shortening the 
opportunities for discussion and for reconsideration of important 
questions is clearly an appropriate way for many boards to 
improve their operative efficiency.  On the other hand, 
streamlining intrinsically requires the reduction or elimination of 
deliberative and consultative input, and sometimes amounts to a 
descriptive euphemism which softens the reality of changes in 
power relationships that are actually at the core of what the 
organization seeks to accomplish.59  As environmental and 
consumer advocates have learned to their dismay, the 
streamlining of review processes is too often a vehicle for 
eliminating public input.60  Likewise, in the area of nonprofit 
governance, streamlining may mean reducing the opportunity 
for board input in management decisions, or for previously 
involved constituencies to protect their own interests. 
The Red Cross made intensive efforts to streamline its 
governance structure after being caught in a spotlight of 
intensive congressional investigation and massive publicity in the 
wake of its handling of relief in the 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina 
disasters.61  In that context, the Red Cross announced that it 
 
58 See CHAIT ET AL., supra note 26; see also Cornerstone Consulting Assoc., LLC, 
About Us:  Our Clients, http://www.cornerstoneconsultingassociates.com/ 
clients.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2007) (consultant helped streamline amount of 
time spent on planning and communication). 
59 One scholar of linguistic uses, in fact, defines “streamline” as a euphemism for 
“fire,” “release,” “downsize,” and “lay off.”  Scott Alkire, Introducing Euphemisms 
to Language Learners, INTERNET TESL J., Vol. VIII, No. 5, May 2002, available at 
http://iteslj.org/Lessons/Alkire-Euphemisms.html; see also Dustin Solberg, What a 
Difference a Citizen Can Make, ‘Proposal 121’ Rallies Bay Fishing Community, 
BRISTOL BAY TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005, available at 
http://www.renewableresourcescoalition.org/news_updates3.htm (streamlining of 
environmental clearance process is a way to reduce or eliminate public input). 
60 Solberg, supra note 59. 
61 See Robert A. Katz, A Pig in a Python:  How the Charitable Response to 
September 11 Overwhelmed the Law of Disaster Relief, 36 IND. L. REV. 251, 302–19 
(2003); AM. RED CROSS, REP. FOR THE BD. OF GOVERNORS (2006), 
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would streamline its board and create a more efficient operating 
structure.62  Its plans included cutting back sharply the “size and 
management role” of its fifty-member board, all under the 
approval of Congress, which had imposed the current board 
structure through amendments in 1947 to a subsequent charter.63  
The proposed changes were to shrink the board to between 
twelve and twenty members.64  In addition, the chairman would 
no longer have been its “principal officer,” and instead would 
have been designated its CEO.65 
According to The New York Times, the interim president 
concluded that the Red Cross had “a board designed and set up 
by guiding principles from a time that is no longer relevant. . . . 
We need to take the board, its design, conventions and operating 
mechanisms, and bring that board up to today’s expectations.”66  
The redistribution of resources, conflicts between smaller and 
larger chapters, and executive-level politics were also said to 
play a role in the decision to undertake restructuring.67 
The Red Cross consultant on governance, Ira Milstein, 
assessed its problem as too much consultation with advisory 
“cabinet secretaries” and too much interference from parochial 
interests; he referred to the existing board as “meddlesome, 
overly influenced by the 35 members elected by local chapters 
and too big to move quickly and efficiently.”68  The proposal 
gave the board greater authority to pick its own members by 
having a board committee nominate candidates, who would then 
be elected by delegates to the annual meeting.69  This was not 
enough reform for William Josephson, the former head of the 
 
http://www.redcross.org/static/file_cont5765_lang0_2202.pdf (noting Hurricane 
Katrina’s effect on the Red Cross and its impact on the organization’s decision to 
reorganize and streamline its governance). 
62 Stephanie Strom, Red Cross to Streamline Board’s Management Role, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at A16 [hereinafter Strom, Red Cross]. 
63 Id.; see also Am. Red Cross, Federal Charter of the Am. Red Cross, 
http://www.redcross.org/museum/history/charter.asp (last visited Aug. 29, 2007) 
[hereinafter Am. Red Cross Charter]. 
64 Strom, Red Cross, supra note 62. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 See Jacqueline L. Salmon, Chapter Overhaul Adds to Red Cross Turmoil, 
WASH. POST, June 27, 2006, at A12. 
68 Strom, Red Cross, supra note 62. 
69 Id. 
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charities bureau in the New York Attorney General’s Office, 
who said that the power of the chapters would be too great, and 
“obviously not consistent with good governance.”70 
In May 2007, the final adoption of several amendments to the 
Red Cross Charter substantially reduced the amount of 
consultation required for the Board to approve major 
decisions.71  Whether the reorganization of the Red Cross will 
prove to be a significant gain for the organization will become 
clearer over the course of the next several years. 
The Red Cross reorganization process presented unusual 
difficulties because it was directly in the public spotlight and 
because it was chartered federally, and therefore its streamlining 
involved more intense scrutiny than otherwise; but the 
membership corporation rules in most states neither prohibit 
curtailing consultative governance relationships contained in 
bylaws, nor establish minimal procedural rules, nor facilitate 
challenges to fundamental restructurings by private parties.  
Except where nonprofit organizations choose to tie their own 
hands by inserting restrictive language in charters and bylaws to 
insure constituent input into the modification of customary 
consultative practices, state law and administrative agency 
practices tolerate near-complete control by board majorities 
over consultative procedures, and few have voiced concern over 
this approach.  Neither the Internal Revenue Service nor state 
attorneys general nor statutory rules governing the formation or 
modification of governing instruments meaningfully restrict the 
downsizing of boards or the elimination of consultative groups. 
With respect to nonmembership organizations, and outside 
the context of nonprofit governmental bodies, perhaps the only 
rule that would bear on the decision of a self-perpetuating group 
to eliminate advisory bodies might be a decision to reduce the 
size of a board to not less than three persons.72 
 
70 Id. 
71 See Am. Red Cross Charter, supra note 63; Press Release, Red Cross, Red 
Cross Board Votes to Transform Governance, (Oct. 30, 2006), available at 
http://www.redcross.org/pressrelease/0,1077,0_314_5751,00.html. 
72 Cf. Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.03 (1987).  The Act requires that 
the board of directors “must consist of three or more individuals, with the number 
specified in or fixed in accordance with the articles or bylaws.” 
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TABLE 1 
ANTICONSULTATIVE TRENDS IN THE BOARDROOM 
 
Indicator Example Authorization 
Nondisclosure 
agreements and 
executive policies 
diminish policy 
debates 
ACLU  Bylaw 
modifications, 
board policy 
handbooks, and 
director pledges 
Formal charters are 
capable of 
compartmentalizing 
authority  
NYSE Compensation 
committee 
procedures and 
consultant 
reports 
Streamlined 
governance reduces 
consultation with 
advisory bodies 
Red Cross Senatorial 
investigation 
and 
bylaw 
amendments 
 
IV 
LEGAL ACCOMMODATION:  MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
The new flexibility required of nonprofits–they must be “fast 
acting,” “responsive to change,” and “easily adaptable”–has 
also fostered its own set of imperatives insofar as employment 
and organizational structure are concerned.  In some areas of 
activity, for example, it is no longer advisable or even possible to 
keep a significant number of professional staff employed with 
long-term employment contracts.  Preexisting bylaws, governing 
instruments, and standards of professional conduct sometimes 
stand in the way of adaptability. 
A.  Compensation 
One indicator that management practices are changing at the 
expense of traditional nonprofit employment models is the 
changing approach toward compensating nonprofit employees.  
An earlier section of this article alluded to the approaches 
boards use to determine the compensation of executive 
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directors, including the emulation by nonprofit board 
compensation committees of for-profit procedures and 
compensation metrics. 
Beneath the executive level, nonprofit managers are 
increasingly inclined to jettison older principles of compensation, 
which tempered relative accomplishment with egalitarian 
impulses and therefore deemphasized bonuses.  Approximately 
25 percent of nonprofit organizations “offer their key managers 
the opportunity to earn cash compensation awards in addition to 
their base salaries.”73  Most of these programs are based on 
incentives tied to performance measures.74 
Some compensation schemes provide incentives that reward 
team accomplishments, but as a general matter group 
collaboration and collective responsibility for decision making 
make it more difficult for managers to assess individual merit 
entitlements.  In step with this trend toward more targeted 
performance incentives, IRS rules and tax court opinions 
accommodate end-of-the-year performance-based bonuses and 
other forms of incentive pay that were previously unusual in the 
nonprofit sector.75 
B.  Employment Security 
Employment security policies provide another indicator that 
management practices are changing at the expense of traditional 
nonprofit employment models.  Courts have also been 
deferential when nonprofit managers decide to restructure 
poorly performing operating units by dismissing employees, even 
when professional staff members lose their positions.  Whereas 
only a few decades ago professional staff in nonprofit 
organizations received increasing protection under labor laws 
and under broad interpretations of nonprofit governing 
 
73 James E. Rocco, Making Incentive Compensation Plans Work in Non-Profit 
Organizations, THE DEV. RES. GROUP, http://www.drgnyc.com/tips/incentive.html 
(last visited June 20, 2007). 
74 See id. 
75 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rule 200601030 (Jan. 6, 2006) (public nonprofit corporation’s 
long-term incentive bonus program for its senior managers was found to be 
consistent with Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) and would not prevent the 
organization from operating exclusively for tax-exempt purposes or otherwise 
jeopardize its tax-exempt status). 
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instruments and policy handbooks,76 that picture has changed.  
In Major v. Memorial Hospitals Ass’n,77 for example, the court 
upheld a hospital’s decision to change its anesthesiology 
department from its traditionally “open” staff system to a newer 
“closed” system that “contracted out” the work using an 
exclusive provider.  Because the decision was deemed 
“administrative” and not “adjudicative,” and was motivated by 
the overall problems associated with the operation of the 
department, the court determined that the plaintiffs were not 
entitled to due process in accordance with the medical staff 
bylaws prior to termination of their medical staff privileges.78  
Such judicial interpretations of bylaw restrictions which favor 
wider managerial discretion and greater executive power at the 
expense of professional autonomy reflect judicial sympathy with 
the contemporary emphasis on advancing the accountability and 
financial viability discussed earlier. 
C.  Mission Drift 
Mission drift is another indicator that management practices 
are changing.  Entrepreneurial activity has been on the rise, 
fueled by financial stress.  Financially profitable activities, 
however, are not necessarily at the core of an organization’s 
mission.79  On occasion, nonprofits are reported to have chosen 
to devote key resources to colorably related activities in order to 
 
76 See Kristin Hay O’Neal, Note, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement 
Corporation of America:  Possible Implications for Supervisory Status Analysis of 
Professionals Under the National Labor Relations Act, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 841, 845 
n.15 (1995); David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers from Covered 
Professionals Under the NLRA, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1775, 1805 n.127, 1856–58 
(1989) (observing that the National Labor Relations Board reversed its position on 
protection for nonprofit professional employees to include them, emphasizing “the 
difficulty of distinguishing commercial from noncommercial activity,” and “the 
growing congressional sentiment that employees in the nonprofit sector deserve the 
same protection as other workers.”).  NLRA amendments in 1974 extended 
nonprofit healthcare workers protection under the Act. 
77 Major v. Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). 
78 Id. at 530–32. 
79 Salamon & O’Sullivan, supra note 25, at 4–5 (stating “dramatically, 84 percent 
of the organizations reported increasing their attention to commercial sources of 
support, including expanded marketing and increased or expanded fee-for-service 
activities.”  Eleven percent of nonprofit elderly and housing services groups studied, 
7 percent of child and family services groups, and 12 percent of economic 
development groups had started a profit-making subsidiary in 2003 alone.) 
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grow or obtain financial stability, rather than to try to 
accomplish purposes more essentially related to the ones for 
which their founders created them, for which volunteers and 
most donors contributed their time and money, and for which 
the state originally chartered them.  Surveys indicate, for 
example, that theaters and museums have “scaled back the 
artistic content of their programming,” and shifted to “a more 
‘commercially appealing’ season;” hospitals have invested 
millions to develop health spas and gyms.”80 
It may appear that the problem of “mission creep” or 
“mission drift” is not one that implicates collaboration or 
consultation, that it is only an effort to find profitable 
opportunity somewhere within the scope of the mission of a 
charity.  To the extent that exploiting economic opportunity 
costs even when the exploitation requires revision of missions 
and donor intentions, however, conflicts between managers and 
affected constituencies are about involvement in decision 
making.  Often contemporary conflicts over “donor control” and 
“cy pres” amount to conflicts about the extent to which donors 
and grantors should be consulted by nonprofit managers.81 
 
 
80 Id. at 8; see also Curt Bailey & Karla Martin, Getting to “No”:  How Nonprofit 
Organizations Can Stretch Their Limited Resources by Focusing on Priorities and 
Avoiding Mission Creep, LEADING IDEAS, Nov. 14, 2006, at 1, 2, available at 
http://www.strategy-business.com/li/leadingideas/li00002 (claiming that “[f]rontline 
managers begin to see the head office not as a source of support, but as a 
bureaucracy that issues endless and often conflicting directives, which they must 
work around and even ignore to get something accomplished.”). 
81 See Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 433–34 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001); In re Milton Hershey Sch., 867 A.2d 674, 689–91 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2005); see also Robert A Katz, Let Charitable Directors Direct:  Why 
Trust Law Should Not Curb Board Discretion over a Charitable Corporation’s 
Mission and Unrestricted Assets, 80 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 689, 695–98 (2005). 
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TABLE 2 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE INDICATORS 
 
INDICATOR EXAMPLE LEGAL 
AUTHORITY 
Compensation Year-end bonuses IRS letter rulings 
Employment 
security 
 
Contracting out  Reinterpretation of 
bylaws 
Mission drift Pursuing profitable 
activities with 
marginal mission 
value  
Common-law 
administrative 
decision doctrines 
 
V 
LEGAL ACCOMMODATION:  MEMBERSHIP RIGHTS 
A.  Optionality 
In a perceptive article titled Dismembering Civil Society:  The 
Social Cost of Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits,82 Dana 
Brakman Reiser argues that a failure of nonprofit corporation 
laws to encourage the use of the membership form of nonprofit 
organization, on one hand, and an emphasis on financial 
accountability, on the other hand, has impoverished civil society 
and diminished “social capital”: 
 [The] focus on accountability ignores the nonprofit sector’s 
role in constructing and maintaining civil society. . . . Theorists 
who have examined civil society argue that participation in 
these institutions enhances our political democracy in two 
ways.  It offers opportunities for participants to build norms of 
reciprocity and cooperation–also called social capital.83 
Professor Reiser provides several illustrations of the developing 
legal regime’s blindness to the value of democratic internal 
governance in nonprofit organizations to civil discourse in 
 
82 Reiser, supra note 30. 
83 Id. at 830–31 (footnotes omitted). 
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democratic society.84  In particular, she singles out the choice 
given to incorporators to decide whether to organize as 
membership or nonmembership corporations (“optionality,” in 
her vocabulary).85  In every state and in the Revised Model 
Nonprofit Corporation Act, there is no need for organizations of 
any sort to organize as membership organizations if they don’t 
wish to.86  Other political theorists, tracing back at least to 
Talcott Parsons and Robert Dahl, have argued that political 
democracy is enhanced by teaching civic skills.87  These skills are 
arguably better honed in more consultative organizations. 
Accepting Reiser’s fundamental point about the civic virtues 
inherent to the values she identifies with her version of 
membership, there nevertheless is not very much to recommend 
membership over nonmembership organizations under the legal 
regimes that currently apply to membership organizations.  
Without plunging into a debate about trends in social capital–
however it is defined and measured–it seems that the values of 
social discourse and many other civic virtues adhere to most 
types of nonprofit form aside from the membership form. 
The point deserves to be pressed considerably further.  Most 
of the factors that Reiser identifies as those leading counselors to 
advise incorporators to choose the nonmembership rather than 
the membership form are not really factors that weigh against 
democracy as such.  Nonprofit organizers and managers are 
trying to avoid, with increasing frequency, the collaborative and 
consultative aspects of nonprofit governance which are tied to 
membership and nonmembership corporations alike, but which 
historically have been harder to avoid in membership 
organizations. 
The virtues of consultative and collaborative forms flow from 
the same inefficiencies that account for their costs.  As Reiser 
observes in connection with membership groups: 
[T]he costs of such a democratic internal governance structure 
are substantial and definite.  These include, inter alia, the 
 
84 Id. at 831. 
85 Id. 
86 See Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, Ch. 7, Sub-Ch. B (Proposed 2006). 
87 See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 
(1982); ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOOM, POLICIES, ECONOMICS, 
AND WELFARE (Univ. Chi. Press 1976) (1953); MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC 
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
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administrative costs of identifying members, maintaining 
current membership lists, holding meetings, obtaining a 
quorum for such meetings and the required majorities 
necessary to elect directors and pass other measures, and 
providing materials necessary to inform membership voting.  
Further, a voting membership structure imposes costs on 
transactions by forcing both a board and a membership 
decision on certain significant corporate actions–typically, 
amendments of the articles of incorporation, merger, sale of all 
or substantially all assets, and dissolution.  These costs can be 
avoided entirely through use of a self-perpetuating board. 
88
 
While the above costs can be avoided entirely through use of a 
self-perpetuating board and a nonmembership form, there are 
many other costs, risks, and benefits attached to collaboration 
and consultation that will adhere regardless of the 
membership/nonmembership distinction.  From this perspective, 
the question is not about the membership form per se, but about 
the degree to which collaborative and consultative modes of 
operation have diminished across every organizational form. 
B.  Election Procedures and Membership Standing 
Ironically, case law suggests that, in many states, membership 
corporations do not need to incur even the relatively modest 
costs of democracy that Reiser suggests.  A principal reason is 
that nonprofit standing to contest antidemocratic processes has 
been restricted quite severely in comparison to for-profits.89  
Courts have displayed a broad deference to the actions taken by 
incumbent boards of membership corporations when they 
evaluate the permissible efforts that can be taken to insulate 
incumbent candidates and allow self-perpetuation of boards 
through restrictive bylaw provisions, unwritten campaign rules, 
nondisclosure, and even the expenditure of substantial 
organizational money. 
Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California offers a 
dramatic illustration.90  In Olson, challengers ran for the club’s 
 
88 Reiser, supra note 30, at 864 (footnotes omitted). 
89 See Russell v. Yale Univ., 737 A.2d 941, 946 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999) (Yale 
alumni membership denied standing); Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in 
the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37, 52–59 (1993).  But see In re Milton 
Hershey Sch., 867 A.2d 674, 689–691 (members of alumni association granted 
standing to contest board settlement agreement based on special interest). 
90 Olson v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (certified 
for partial publication).  For full opinion see Olson v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., No. 
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board of directors, advocating, inter alia, greater regard for mass 
transit issues.91  After the club spent $6 million of club funds to 
defeat them, the challengers sued to overturn the election and 
limit campaign spending to reasonable and proportionate 
amounts in relation to the amount spent by the petition 
nominees, and to require that opposition campaign statements 
and biographies be included in club proxy solicitations.  The trial 
court decided that these arguments were meritless, because they 
were inconsistent with the statutory scheme.  The court gave 
credence to a defense expert who testified that California’s 
Nonprofit Mutual Benefit Corporation Code actually 
discouraged elections in routine situations, and it was persuaded 
that members do not join the club to get involved in political 
controversies and elections, and that artificial stimulation of 
elections is a distraction to management.92  Shortly after the 
opinion, the club asked its members to eliminate the election of 
directors entirely.  Thus, as Olson demonstrates, common law 
and statutory protections, even for members of membership and 
mutual benefit organizations, have proven to be adjustable in 
light of the anticonsultative trends in favor in recent years. 
 
B168730, *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), California Courts website, www.courtinfo.ca.gov/ 
opinions/revpub/B168730.DOC (Order of the Court, describing both Olson’s 
original prayer for relief, as well as additional requests brought forth on appeal) 
[hereinafter Olson full opinion]. 
91 See Olson full opinion, at *2. 
92 See id. at *15. 
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TABLE 3 
MEMBERSHIP INDICATORS 
 
INDICATOR EXAMPLE LEGAL 
AUTHORITY 
Compensation Year-end bonuses IRS letter rulings 
Employment 
security 
 
Contracting out  Reinterpretation of 
bylaws 
Mission drift Pursuing profitable 
activities with 
marginal mission 
value  
Common-law 
administrative 
decision doctrines 
 
VI 
MEANS AND ENDS IN NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE 
Growing up, many of us developed an instinct that 
collaboration was usually a good thing.  Perhaps because we 
were almost never in a position of power or authority as young 
people, we resisted autocratic, top-down approaches in 
education and family life.  We wanted our opinions–however 
well informed by knowledge or experience–to count.  We 
wanted our voices to be heard.  At school, the word 
“collaboration” was often used synonymously with “teamwork,” 
and consultation with others was almost always highly 
encouraged–except, of course, when multiple-choice tests were 
administered.93 
With respect to the use of processes for deliberation in 
governance, we acquired the view that collaboration by different 
groups with common interests was a necessary but insufficient 
component for successful reform in democracies.  Collaborative 
and consultative impulses usually received endorsement in the 
political science and historical literature we were assigned, as 
 
93 See, e.g., Colette Daiute & Bridget Dalton, Collaboration Between Children 
Learning to Write:  Can Novices Be Masters? 10 COGNITION & INSTRUCTION 281–
333 (1993). 
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well.  This literature typically associated these processes with 
freedom, freedom with democracy, and democracy with 
legitimate and relatively more effective and honest government. 
Collaboration today is still offered inside and outside of 
business as a method designed to improve creativity without 
regard to any democratic or legitimacy-increasing imperatives.  
The legendary origins tales of Silicon Valley all pay homage to 
the collaborative impulse as well as to the value of the open 
exchange of information.  Intrinsically undemocratic institutions 
often insist on collaborative and consultative processes within 
the context of command and control authority structures.  The 
Army–which is about as top-down an institution as one might 
imagine–praises collaboration as an important aspect of 
developing successful tactics and strategy, and also as a method 
for sustaining morale. 
Among the theories offered to explain why collaborative and 
consultative processes are important to the accomplishment of 
mission-related goals and objectives are included these four:  (1) 
that superior supervision and added intelligence result from 
consultative discourse because these processes demand 
increased attention to the desirability of the course of conduct 
advocated; (2) that collaboration incorporates an adversary 
contest in which intellectual combat and truth testing increases 
the probability of correct answers; (3) that providing 
stakeholders with a voice in the operation of an organization 
instills a sense of responsibility and leads parties to identify with 
the future success of initiatives which have been the object of an 
investment; and (4) that the invocation of a communal will 
actually improves the reception afforded to corporate activity. 
But all of these virtues ought to be weighed against the 
drawbacks.  Preserving traditions of consultation and 
collaboration can cost more than they are worth in time and 
money.  As with the case of the American political deliberative 
process, it is difficult to agree about how much process is 
necessary or sufficient.  Collaboration and consultation 
requirements can also:  (1) lead to gaming the system through 
roadblocks and deadlocks; (2) lead to equivocation and 
compromise when bold and decisive action is called for; (3) 
make it more difficult to maintain confidentiality when multiple 
parties are involved in decision making; (4) undermine 
important interests in cohesion and in the projection of a 
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common corporate devotion to purpose; and (5) diffuse 
responsibility for poor choices.  Perhaps there is a negative 
relationship between collective forms of governance and 
accountability which ought not be dismissed. 
The traditional literature about the importance of 
collaboration to nonprofit corporate governance asserts either 
explicitly or implicitly that, notwithstanding their drawbacks, 
they would in the long run generate results preferable to those 
eventuating from what might be called the antithesis of 
collaboration–namely, authoritarian and autocratic executive 
decision making.  The traditional claim has been that collective 
and collaborative approaches usually serve organizations and the 
collective public interest better than does control and decision 
making exercised by powerful individuals or small groups that 
make decisions in the absence of consultation with group 
constituencies, that choose their own successors, and that take 
actions without the need either to explain or listen to others. 
As indicated, the more recent business consultancy literature 
proceeds from an opposite assumption.  Whether or not it is 
“politically correct” or expedient to operate along 
democratically consultative lines, this literature insists that in the 
new climate, nonprofit organizations that reject business 
accountability and hierarchical models do so at their peril.  It 
may be that the legal convergence of nonprofit and for-profit 
governance structure and style is the inevitable consequence of 
the economic convergence of nonprofit and for-profit activity.94  
The response of courts, legislatures, and private lawmaking 
projects appears thus far largely to have heeded this business 
consultancy counsel, with relatively little resistance from the 
organized nonprofit community. 
At least one observer has argued that the unwillingness of the 
sector to rise to its own defense can be attributed, in addition to 
financial and accountability challenges, to the failure to identify 
essential valued aspects of the nonprofit culture:  “[I]n an era 
where being businesslike is the great American ideal, the 
 
94 Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals:  The Economic Convergence of the 
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 535–36 
(1996) (stating that the legal and economic differences between nonprofit and for-
profit organizations are “more of a degree than of kind,” but that the two types of 
organizations should not necessarily be legally treated the same “based solely on 
the implications from economics”). 
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nonprofit sector has been unable or unwilling to mount a stirring 
call to nonprofit-ness–let alone develop a rigorous model of 
what being nonprofit-like might mean.”95  Without further 
empirical work, it is not possible to evaluate this sort of response 
and determine whether the nonprofit legal regime, or particular 
parts of it, should fortify consultative and collaborative 
standards and resist recent developments. 
Broader questions also deserve more attention.  Is success in 
meeting the accountability and viability challenges at the 
individual level weakening long-term welfare at the collective 
level?  At what point will the distinctions between nonprofit and 
for-profit operations cease to be significant enough to justify the 
privileges, benefits, and esteem that the legal and political 
system afford? 
At the intersection of legal structure and political theory, even 
if there proves to be no genuine concern about the impact of 
legal trends on the collective welfare of the nonprofit sector, 
there may still be an unfortunate relationship between the 
demise of traditional governance rules and democracy and social 
capital.  Under these circumstances, retaining and reinforcing 
traditional collaborative values still should have a greater 
priority. 
The task ahead is to determine the extent to which nonprofit 
law should continue to encourage nonprofits to adopt for-profit 
governance and management practices.  If the proliferation of 
hybrid corporate forms in recent years is any indication, it may 
be that more differentiation among the choices for incorporation 
(and the legal privileges and duties attached), rather than less, 
will be desirable.96 
As they evaluate the changes discussed above, courts and 
legislatures would do well to factor in those core values that 
have supported the special treatment nonprofits continue, 
somewhat precariously, to receive. 
 
 
95 Light, supra note 19. 
96 See Brody, supra note 94, at 535 (offering an explanation for convergence).  
But see Evelyn Brody, Book Note, The Twilight of Organizational Form for Charity:  
Musings on Norman Silber, A Corporate Form of Freedom:  The Emergence of the 
Modern Nonprofit Sector, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1261, 1267 (2002) (resisting 
proposals that would differentiate legal standards based on the type of charitable 
activity). 
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